India's Nuclear Disarmament with India and China
G. Thulasiram
Post Doctoral Fellow, Department of Political Science, S.V. University, Tirupati A.P. India
*Corresponding Author E-mail:
India's relations with China have been a major factor in India's foreign policy. Since India was so preoccupied in her post-partition problems and China was so deeply involved in the civil war that, as Werner Levi wrote: "direct relations between the two countries, apart from contacts in international bodies were mostly restricted to the formalities and routine of the usual international contact".[1] But, soon the two countries were to develop intimate and friendly bilateral relations. This meant revival of age old friendship between the two largest countries of Asia. The arrival of western imperialism in Asia had disturbed the traditional friendship. In population, human resources and potential, India and China, the two giant of Asia, far outstrip any other country of Asia. "They carry the weight of proud history stretching into mythology and appear to be both ageless and timeless."[2] Cultural exchanges between the two countries had taken place even more than 2000 years back. But, in modern times it was at the Brussels Conference of 1927, where several depressed nations had assembled, a joint statement was issued by the representatives of China and India. It underlined the need for Sino-Indian cooperation in the task of liberation of Asia from western imperialism. During the japanese attack on Manchuria province of China in 1931 not only "China Day" was observed in India but a call was also given by Indian nationalists for boycott of Japanese goods. The Asian Relations Conference was convened in New Delhi in March, 1947. At that time India was not yet independent, but Jawaharlal Nehru was the Interim Prime Minister. The Chinese delegates, sent by Chinag Kai-Shek's KMT (Kuomintang) Government, objected to a map in which Tibet was not shown as part of China.
The Chinese also protested against India's recognition of the Tibetan delegation. However, KMT China did not show any concern when Pakistan supported tribesmen committed aggression on Kashmir. Meanwhile civil war in China was gradually eroding the authority of KMT Government and communist hold was increasing. By the end of September, 1949 Kuomintang Government lost its hold completely. It fled to Taiwan (Formosa), and mainland China came under the control of Communist Party of China. The People's Republic of China (PRC) was officially proclaimed in Peking on October 1, 1949. K.M.Panikkar who was India's Ambassador to China opined shortly before he was accredited to PRC that, "with a Communist China cordial and intimate relations were out of question". But, he hoped that an area of cooperation would be worked out. He added: "The only area where our interests overlapped ;was in Tibet". India was among the first countries to have recognized the People's Republic of China. It was done on December 30, 1949. Later, Prime Minister Nehru commented on the Communist Revolution and India's recognition. He told the Lok Sabha: "It produced a perfectly stable government, strongly entrenched and popular. That has nothing to do with our liking it or disliking it... Naturally were came to the decision that the government should be recognized". India fully supported communist China's claim for representation in the UN. Efforts were made to establish cordial relations between New Delhi and Peking. In view of India's support to China, Several non-Communist countries particularly the US, expressed their displeasure. However, India's stand was based on merit of the Chinese case. India's positive response to UN decision declaring North Korea as aggressor in June, 1950 caused unpleasantness in Peking, but when U.S. wanted to censure China for its role in Korean crisis India stood by China, and this was fully appreciated. In a letter to Ambassador K.M. Panikkar, Prime Minster Nehru had said that whenever China had a strong government, it had tended to expand beyond its frontiers. This tendency would again be visible in a "vigorously pulsating and dynamic new China". Nehru had noted that what had happened in China in 1949 was not a palace revolution; it was a grass root revolution. Therefore, as Professor V.P. Dutt wrote, "Nehru advocated the policy of befriending the Chinese revolution, bringing new China into the main stream of the world community, encouraging contacts, lessening hostilities and suspicions..." Nehru hoped to avoid conflicts with China. But this could not be achieved.
The Border Dispute
The developments in Tibet had undermined India's faith in China's sincerity. It was felt in India that, as if to retaliate against what had happened in Tibet, China began intrusions in India's territory. To justify their action, they accused that Indian armed personnel had `unlawfully intruded' into `Chinese territory' despite `solemn warning by the Chinese frontier guards'. This meant that China was claiming several thousand miles of Indian territory as its own and was declaring the presence of India troops in their own territory as intrusion in `Chinese territory'. There is over 2200 mile long border between India and China. The boundary line was regulated by agreements and administrative arrangements. Besides, the natural dividing line is also so clear that there could hardly be any doubt regarding exact border between the two countries. The entire sino-Indian border can be generally divided into three areas: the border to the east of Bhutan, the central border across Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh, and the border separating Jammu & Kashmir from Chinese territories of Sinkiang and Tibet. The border dispute relates mainly to McMahon Line in North-East, and Ladakh in North-West.
The McMahon Line
This is the boundary line between the two countries, east of Bhutan. India has always treated the McMahon Line as the lawfully demarcated border between India and China. But, china condemned it as `imperialist line'. The McMahon Line was determined in 1914 at a conference of the representatives of British India, Tibet and China, held at Shimla. The conference was held to sort out border differences between Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and Tibet. The Secretary of State for India (in British Cabinet) Arthur Henry McMahon represented India in the Shmila Conference. An agreement was concluded which divided Tibet into Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. The boundary between Outer Tibet and India was demarcated at the high mountain peaks. The line was drawn on the suggestion of McMahon who himself drew a line by a red pen on the map. The line so drawn came to be known as the McMahon Line. It is in a way natural boundary also as it passes through Tibet Plateau in the north and Indian hills in the South. The map was signed by representatives of British India, Tibet and China. But, the Chinese Government did not ratify it. Nevertheless, no government of China ever disputed this boundary line; India always accepted it.
Ladakh
Ladakh is, and has always been, a part of the State of Jammu & Kashmir. The State was under British paramountcy till independence and later acceded to India, as an integral part of this country. Although ladakh-China border was not demarcated by any treaty, yet India and China have accepted the existing boundary for centuries. This boundary was always shown by India in its maps. The tourists who came to India from time to time also mentioned this border in their writings. It was made clear in a note sent by India to China in 1899 that Aksai Chin was a part of Indian Territory. the revenue records of the State of Jammu & Kashmir also confirm that Aksai Chin was always a part of Ladakh region of Jammu & Kashmir.
INDIA - CHINA WAR, 1962
To begin with Chinese troops crossed the McMahon Line in NEFA in the eastern sector on September 8, 1962, and occupied a good part of Indian territory. Pressed by political compulsions, Nehru told the media on October 13, 1962 that his Government had asked the army to throw the Chinese out of our territory. This provoked the Chinese. Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul later wrote in The Untold Story that: No General who knew the serous military situation confronting us in NEFA and Ladakh at the time could have advised him to do so ..... It is my surprise that Nehru took up a posture of `courage' when he knew that we were militarily weak, in the hope that with this bold statement the Chinese might be deterred from attacking India. He might also have been advised by one of his political confidants to make such a statement for public consumption for psychological reasons. The Chinese would have struck us anyhow; if not then, perhaps later, But, I wonder if Nehru's statement did not precipitate their attack. Whether due to Nehru's statement or otherwise, the Chinese launched a massive attack on October 20, 1962 in North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) as well as in the Ladakh Sector. Two important Indian posts in NEFA were captured within 24 hours. According to Krishna Menon, the attack was so massive that it appeared that had unleashed its fury on the indian frontiers. By October 25, Chinese were India about 16 miles south of McMahon Line. After about two weeks of less vigorous fighting the Chinese began attack on a very large scale on November 15 in both NEFA and Ladakh sectors. By November 16, the Chinese had crossed Bomdila and reached the plains of Assam. The entire area in Ladakh that China was claiming was captured by its army. the victorious Chinese, in the eastern sector, reached a spot in Assam overlooking river Brahmaputra, plains of Assam and the Bay of Bengal. Indian army suffered heavy casualties, though Chinese losses were even heavier. But, despite such serious level of warfare, formal declaration of war was not made, and diplomatic missions in both the countries were not closed down. The Ambassadors left their missions, but the two Embassies in Peking and New Delhi functioned with skeleton staff for many years. Meanwhile, on the urgent request of India, both Britain and the US rushed necessary war material needed by the Indian army, particularly for mountain warfare. Suddenly on November 21, 1962 the Chinese announced unilateral cases-fire. Earlier China had made three point proposal for cease fire and agree to honour the line of actual control (LOC) and that both the armies withdraw 20 km from the LOC on their sides. Secondly, even if India refused to withdrew, China would unilaterally withdrew 20 km north of LOC, provided both countries respected the line of control. Thirdly, the two Prime Ministers should confer to find a solution to the problem. India rejected the proposals, and suggested that China restore the status quo ante as on September 8, 1962. This was not accepted by China.
After the unilateral announcement of cease fire on November 21, 1962, China repeated its proposals which were again turned down by India. Once again India suggested status quo ante on 8th September. Stalemate followed. India had suffered humiliation as the war allowed China to occupy plenty of Indian territory. Timely help by Britain and the U.S. perhaps compelled China to cease fire and withdraw to the point chosen by them. "Nehru's policy towards China lay in shambles, even though the postulates on which it was founded were not wrong .... Nehru had not realised the full extent of the change in Chinese foreign policy and its implications, and public in India had been left totally uneducated by the mass media in this regard ...."[3] The border war left a trail of bitterness. Mutual hostility dominated the Sino-Indian relations for nearly two decades.China initiated a powerful anti-India campaign by propagating that India was no longer non-aligned and that it was firmly in the American imperialist camp. India, however, had not changed its policy. Even after this humiliation, India continued to support China in regard to Taiwan and Tibet and fully backed China's efforts for representation in the UN. It was China who had moved closer to Pakistan, shifted its position on Kashmir and gradually had become a major source of supply of military and economic aid to Pakistan. To quote Professor V.P.Dutt again, "India's pride had been grievously hurt she felt betrayed and her nationalism had been sharply awakened:[4] India believed that China wanted to dominate the entire Asia. As Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri said in the Parliament in 1965 during Indo-Pak War, "To justify its aggressive attitude, China, are being bullied by India. The basic objective of China is to claim for itself a position of dominance in Asia, which no self-respecting nation in Asia is prepared to recognize."
SINO - INDIAN RELATIONS, 1965-80
China developed close relations with Islamic Pakistan. It was a strange combination which was meant mainly to isolate India. During India-Pakistan war of 1965, China clearly demonstrated its hostility towards India and gave moral and diplomatic support to Pakistan, China had already become aid giver to Pakistan. During the 1965 war, Indian troops captured from pakistanis not only American weapons but also armaments with Chinese markings. During the war, China gave an ultimatum to India on September 16, 1965 asking India to vacate 56 military establishments on India-Sikkim-China border, which, according to China, were illegally constructed by India. China gave three days time to withdraw from the allegedly illegal establishment, failing which India would have to face serious consequences. This ultimatum was meant to show China's soliderity with Pakistan. But big powers got disturbed and they gave a stern warning to China not to precipitate the matter. Prime Minister Shastri clearly told China that there was no truth in the alleged violation of Sikkim-China boundary by India, and India rejected all Chinese claims on Indian territory. Several unsuccessful initiatives were taken during Indira Gandhi's Prime Ministership. Two Chinese Embassy officials in Delhi were arrested for espionage in June, 1967, and in September China attacked Indian positioned Nathu la. China attacked another Indian post at Cho la in October, and again in April, 1968 manipulations were done at Nathu la. Following criticism by many countries, China stopped aggressive actions against Indian posts in 1970. Welcoming the new developments, the then External Affairs Minister Sardar Swaran Singh called for improvements in Sino-Indian relations. China demonstrated its continued hostility towards India,and support to Pakistan, during Bangladesh crisis in 1971. Mishandling of political situation by Pakistan President Yahya Khan led to declaration of independence by erstwhile East pakistan and later India-Pakistan war resulting in defeat of Pakistan. China was not very vocal in early stages, but when the crisis became explosive, China came up with full and militant support to Pakistan. It, however, stopped short of actual intervention in the war. Z.A. Bhutto was not holding any office at that time, but was hoping to lead government if Mujib could be denied this privilege. Yahya Khan later admitted that Bhutto had misled him to believe that China was going to actively intervene in the war on the side of Pakistan. Even U.S. was expecting Chinese intervention. But, the signing of indo-Soviet Treaty in August, 1971 deterred both China and America from intervention. But, short of intervention, China gave full support to Pakistan. China's permanent representative to UN described India's case as "gangster logic", and asserted that the question of East Pakistan was purely an internal matter of Pakistan.[5]Independence of Bangladesh could not be prevented, but China blocked Bangladesh's admission to the UN by exercising its veto in the Security Council. China's main concern was to stand by Pakistan and it forgot that its own representation in UN had remained blocked for over two decades because of U.S.veto. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was optimistic. She hoped in January, 1972 that despite China-Pak axis, relations between India and China could improve. Another border violation was committed in October, 1975 in the eastern sector in which four of Indian jawans were killed.
India's Nuclear Test
India conducted its nuclear test in Rajasthan desert in May 1974. India made it clear that it's nuclear programme was only for peaceful purposes and it was not going to manufacture nuclear weapons. But, China viewed India's nuclear blast as a means to blackmail smaller neighbors. If fact this type of allegations were levelled against China itself when it had first exploded its nuclear device. But , there was a clear difference as China's test was aimed at nuclear weapons production, while India's was not. China assured Pakistan against "nuclear blackmail" by India, and reiterated support to Pakistan in Kashmir.
Sikkim
The Chinese reaction was very strong when people of Sikkim rose in revolt (1974-75) against their ruler the Chogyal, and later when Sikkim's request for merger with India was accepted and it became a state within India Union. China blamed India for the problems in Sikkim, and accused her of "expansionism". This was not a new accusation. China said that India was bullying its neighbors, gobbling up Sikkim, had already divided Pakistan, was encouraging anti-national elements in Nepal and giving protection and succor to Tibetan rebels. China stated that it "absolutely does not recognise" Sikkim's status as part of India and that India was trying to create "a great Indian Empire with the backing of Moscow" These were baseless allegations in which even the Soviet Union was involved. India rejected Chinese contention. Mrs Gandhi was of the view that China had no right to speak about Sikkim, in the light of its own track record in Tibet, and also because it did not utter a word when Pakistan had moved into Hunzra.
Leading a table-tennis team that visited India in 1975, a Chinese Vice Minister for sports repeated the theme of traditional friendship between China and India, and in Delhi met senior officials of the Ministry of External Affairs
Normalization of Diplomatic Relations
Although Embassies were functioning, there were no full ambassadorial-level relations between the two countries during 1975, the then Foreign Minister Y.B.Chavan announced in the Lok Sabha that, in a bid to improve relations, India had decided to send an Ambassador to China. Since India had Withdrawn its envoy first, China was waiting for an announcement by New Delhi before reciprocating the gesture. India designated Mr. K.R. Narayanan, a former senior diplomat (Vice-President of India since 1992) as its ambassador to China. With the arrival of a Chinese ambassador in New Delhi diplomatic relations were normalised in 1975. But, exchange of ambassadors by itself was not detente, being aggrieved party, waited for an initiative from China. The reappointment of ambassadors was not opposed by any party in India. According to Jagat S. Mehta, "China perceived that India had emerged politically self-confident and economically resilient after the Bangladesh crisis even in the face of the U.S. China after the fall of the Gang of Four (1967) was also in a constructive mood". The relations between India and China remained strained even after the two ambassadors took charge. Border was only one of the many problems. Even border problem was made complex as the line of control in Aksai Chin area (western sector) was not the same as it was in 1959 or 1962. China had extended the line. Even today the relations remain strained. There is the problem of Karakoram highway which India believes has been built illegally through Indian territory. China has not forgotten the asylum granted to the Dalai Lama and the presence of large number of Tibetans in India. Peking has often accused India of stirring up trouble in Tibet.
Agreement for confidence Building measures, 1996
During a FAO meet on world food problem in Rome in November 1996, Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda met Chinese premier Li Peng and assured him that Dalai Lama would not be allowed to engage in political activity on the Indian soil. Premier Li peng was reported by Xinhua to have said that China treasured its traditional friendship with India and wanted to develop the long-term and stable neighborhood and mutually beneficial cooperative relations with India as a set policy of the Chinese government. The Chinese Premier's statement was a welcome move in the promotion of better and cordial relations, But Indian prime Minister's uncalled for assurance regarding Dalai Lama attracted criticism as an attempt to appease China.
Jiang Zemin, President of China and head of the Chinese Communist party Paid an official visit to India in November, 1996. This was the first who was also Chairman of the Military Commission, held wide ranging talks aimed at normalisation of Sino-Indian relations. He held talks with the President, Prime Minister and leaders of the opposition. During his visit, important agreements were concluded on various issues. The most significant was the "Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-china Border Areas". This was in continuation with normalisation efforts initiated in 1993 during Prime Minister P.V.Narasimha Rao's visit to China. In 1993 it had been agreed "to skirt border dispute" and develop friendly relations in other fields. It was agreed to maintain peace and tranquility on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). It was also decided that acceptance of LAC would not affect the claims of either side for final settlement. Taking the next step, India and China signed the agreement for confidence building in 1996. It provided that the two countries would reduce their military strength along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and that no military activities would be undertaken by either country that affected the other country. The long preamble to the agreement stressed the relevance of Panchsheel, the five principles of peaceful coexistence first initiated by Nehru and Chou En-lai (1954). The agreement stated that it was aimed at "a fair, reasonable, and mutually acceptable settlement" of the complicated border issue. According to the agreement the major categories of armaments to be reduced or limited were combat tanks, infantry combat vehicles, guns (including Hoitzers ) with 75 mm or bigger caliber, mortars with 120 mm or bigger caliber, surface -to- surface missiles, surface to air missiles, and any other system mutually agreed upon. It was also agreed that no military aircraft of either side would fly across the LAC without prior intimation to the other side.
While signing this agreement the two countries underplayed other contentious issues such as the status of Sikkim (as state of Indian Union) and China's nuclear and missile collaboration with Pakistan. India's Foreign Secretary Salman Haider said that for the first time both the sides had formally agreed to reduce their armaments and military presence. Earlier only unilateral withdrawals had taken place. Three other agreements were also concluded by India and China. These were (i) the agreement for the continuation of Indian Consulate in Hongkong after this British colony was restored to China in July, 1997; (ii) an agreement for cooperation between two countries to fight against smuggling of arms and narcotics and other economic offences; and (iii) an agreement to regulate maritime transport including avoidance of double taxation in this regarded. The main agreement for confidence building which provided for prohibition of "military activity that affects the other country" was hailed as a "virtual no war pact", and the revival of Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai spirit was described by the Times of India as amounting to "Asia's giants retie rakhi".[6] However, the leader of opposition Atal Behari Vajpayee, who as Foreign Minister had visited China in 1979, called for cautious approach towards China. He wondered why President Jiang Zemin was "maintaining a mysterious silence", on the border is mountainous, while the Chinese side is plain". In the event of hostilities, the Chinese could summon reinforcements immediately, but India would take time. However, general feeling was that the confidence building agreement would enable the two large Asian neighbors to work towards the maintenance of peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control. "Given the checkered history of the Sino-Indian relationship in the aftermath of the 1962 war and the many unresolved yet contentious bilateral issues, this gradual improvement in the overall ambience augurs well for greater regional stability". This is how C. Uday Bhaskar, Deputy director of the Insitutute for Defence Studies and Analyses commented on the outcome of Jiang Zemin's visit. He added, "Engaging China is the top priority for all major nations and nowhere is this more immediate and urgent than in India". A welcome signal was available from President Jiang Zemin's visit to Pakistan that flowed his Indian tour. The Chinese President "brushed aside Pakistan's attempt to internationalise the Kashmir issue", and said issues that cannot be resolved, for the time being, should be shelved temporarily "to promote normal state-to-state relations".
The Sino-Indian agreement signed by the then Foreign Minister, I.K.Gujral and Chinese Foreign Minister Qichen during President Jiang Zemin's visit to Delhi in November, 1996 was ratified by the Standing committee of Chins's National People's Congress in May, 1997. The Confidence Building Measures included reduction of troops as well as armaments by the two countries in the disputed border areas. The Line of Control was not to be discused nor disturbed. China hoped, after ratifying the accord, that a final solution would soon be found to the long pending border dispute, which has been for the time being put aside. China said: "This agreement will undoubtedly help both China and India in their effort to enhance trust and transparency in the military field along the Line of Actual Control and to continue maintaining peace and tranquility on the China-India border". Good neighborly and friendly relations between Indian and China were not only desired by the leadership of the two countries, were equally keen on peaceful and cordial relations between India and China.
India was one of the first countries to have recognized People's Republic of China in 1949, and one of the first to have established diplomatic relations with the relations with the new regime. After excellent relations between the two countries for nearly a decade two Asian giants had started drifting a long period of adversarial relations, ambassadors were exchanged in 1976 and gradually Sino-Indian relations began to improve, leading ultimately to the signing of a confidence building measures agreement in 1996. But, China reacted sharply against India when this country declared itself a nuclear weapon state. The fresh Chinese hostility was reflected in its demand that India should de-weaponize itself. China fully supported, and still supports, the Security Council Resolution No. 1172 denouncing India's nuclear tests and calling upon her and Pakistan to de-weaponize themselves.In view of China's long-standing friendship with Pakistan, and even its reported assistance in Padistan's nuclear weapon programme, it was expected by Pakistan that China would stand by it on the Kargil issue. But, that did not happened. Like the rest of the international community, China asked Pakistan to withdrew its regulars as well as other intruders from Kargil. During the conflict, Pakistan'sForign Minister Mr.Sartaj Aziz rushed to China, before coming to New Delhi for a day's talks with External Affairs Minister Mr. Jaswant Singh. China refused to support Pakistan's contention that it had no role in Kargil and that the intruders were actually Kashmiri freedom fighters. Thus, China for the first time after several years took a position that supported India's stand. India's Minister of External Affaris Mr.Jaswant Singh paid an official visit to China, during the Kargil crisis, on the formal invitation of his Chinese counterpart. This was in contrast to Mr. Aziz's visti on his own initiative to seek Chinese help and support. Inda's External affairs Minister discussed several issues of international and bilateral interests. The two countries agreed to strength the confidence building measures, and to initiate dialogue on matters of mutual interests. China assured India that it supported India's position that intruders must vacate the entire Kargil area and that the Line of Control must be respected by both the neighbours. This vindicated India's position. India and China were keen to restore friendly relations between two of them. The ground for bilateral talks and new engagement between the two was prepared during Mr. Jaswant Singth's visit to China in June, 1999. China made it clear on the eve of half century celebrations of the establishment of communist regime, that it still stood by the Security Council resolution of June 6, 1998 calling upon India (and Pakistan) to destroy its nuclear weapons and thus, prepare the ground for signing the CTBT. Mr. Wang Yi China's Assistant Minister in the Ministry of Foreign affairs said that China did not agree with the American approach in this respect. What he meant was that while the US (during Talbott Jaswant Sing talks) wanted India to "describe" what it meant by minimum nuclear deterrence, implying that the US accepted India's nuclear status, China did not accept India as a NWS. Mr. Wang said that, "India is China's neighbour and the pursuit of friendly relations is its (China's) policy. But the US case in different". In regard to Pakistan's relations with India, the Chinese Minister opined that. "In our neigbhourhood in South Asia, India and Pakistan are two important countries and we hope the improvement of their relations". However, for this the two countries must have direct talks. By the fall of 1999, China had again begun to talk of warm ties between India and China, the tradition of friendly relations between them, their joint role in outlining the fife principles of peaceful coexistence, which had since become `model of international dealings'. China agreed that India had some concerns over security issues, and added that all questions could be discussed across the table. "China is ready to discuss anything about the security matters with which Indians are concerned". On the occasion of China's golden jubilee, President K.R.Narayanan said that India and China had the responsibility of cooperating with each other in order to ensure in the new millennium, the well-being and prosperity of the people of both countries and also to contribute to peace, stability and justice. Ms Zhang Qiyue of the Chinese Foreign Ministry said that, " Over the past 50 years there have been some twists and turns in the relationship between the two countries but the general trend has been very good and friendly". China stressed that both the countries had a role in the establishment of a new just and fair economic and political world order", and that the two countries shared many common ideals. Lately, China was talking of developing good friendly and neighbourly relations with India. On its part, India was willing to go an extra mile not only in normalizing and improving relations with China but also with Pakistan.
Mr. Jaswant Singth had declared in December, 1998 that India was committed to "further improving" its relations with China and was keen to start a formal dialogue with it. He expected that, on its part, China would help India "Unite the knot" through frequent consulations and talks. Later, China decleared that its differences with India were "temporary" and indicated greater flexibility in accommodating India security concerns. The Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi, Mr Zhou Gang had said early in 1999 that, "We have consistently believed that the problems that cropped up in the Sino- India relations are temporary and can be surmounted". He has also said that the "Outstanding issue between China and India is no more than the boundary dispute left behind by history. In any case, the two countries had put the border issue for the time being on ice. In January 2000, Karmapa, the 14 years old third highest spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhists fled from Tibet, along with his 24 years old sister and five other followers. They travelled secretly by various means, via Nepal, and reached Dharmashala, the seat of Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government in exile. This (seventeenth) Karmapa had beeen earlier instaled with chinese approval. His coming to India embarrassed both India and China. In appeared that India would not grant him asylum. In any case both the countries would have to handle the situation very cautiously as both India and China are keen to improve their bilateral relations. While the only official chinese comment was that the Karmapa, Ugyen Trinley Dorje (Chinese call him Wu Jin Chi Lie) had gone from Lhase "to buy some black hats and religious instruments for the sect", commentators said that he had left because of persecution, and come to India to complete his education.
Recent Out Look on India and China Relations
Defence Minister George Fernandes minced no words. `By and large' he declared, `our understanding is that China is the mother of Ghauri'. A remark that has not gone down well with the mandarins of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) who have shaped the official view on the China for the past two decades. In these years in which the two countries have sought to set their relations on an even keel, the M.E.A. has held a one-dimensional view on the powerful neighbour: China was a benign and even friendly power and tough negotiations could normalize Sino-Indian relations. It took Fernandes, India's very own dragon, to put the record straight. China is all that and much more. It is a country that has an elaborate and sophisticated strategy of engaging India. In friendly relations even while aiding South Asian Countries, especially Pakistan, to pin India's security concerns down to the subcontinent. As Bharat Karnad, a research professor at the Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research, notes, "China is the source of all our troubles. Pakistan is only a sideshow"[7]. China's main concern is the maintenance of peace and tranquility in Tibet. Despite the humiliating defeat it inflicated on India in the 1962 war, China takes the realistic view that the only country capable of embarrassing the Middle Kingdom on Tibet is India which has hosted the Dalai Lama and 80,000 of his supporters since 1959. In a country that quitely acquiesced to the Chinese occupation of Tibet and surrendered substantial treaty rights, Fernandes has been a maverick critic of the official policy on China and Tibet.Returning from the Norht-East on the day Pakistan's Ghauri missile was tested, the defense minister took off on this issue that is taboo, Chinese maps showing Arunachal Pradesh as a part of China. He said that "We have all along been aware of the existence of distorted maps, what surprises me is that the previous Government did not take up the issue with China"[8]. Fernandes also referred to another issue that has been kept under wraps for the past two years - Chinese incursions into the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control that forms the border between Tibet and Arunachal Pradesh. He said the Government was investigating a report that the Chinese had set up a helipad on Indian territory. But even as he targeted China, Fernandes inadvertently added to the confusion over the Ghauri episode. He initially argued that the Prithvi would be an adequate counter. He was obviously not briefed about the fact that the longer-range Prithvi comes with a weight penalty, thus the 250-km-range version Prithvi carries only a 500 kg warhead. Also that the Prithvi has been designed as a conventional weapon, a kind of long-range artillery rather than for the strategic role, that Fernandes assigned to it of being a fitting reply to the Ghauri. Further the short-range Prithvi launch sites would have to be closer to the Pakistani border and hence more vulnerable. Given Fernandes' rather hawkish views on China, he was expected to make some decisive comment on the Agni, the `Technology demonstrator' which has the potential to develop a missile capable of deterring not just the Ghauri but the Chinese missiles deployed on the Tibetan plateau as well. But all he could say was: `There is need to test the Agni as such, as far as I understand'. This was strange coming from a defense minister, since in 1994, a few months after the Agni's last test, the then minister of state for defence Mallikarjun had told the Rajya Sabha that the "technology demonstrator project, Agni, did not envisage development of the Missile for deployment as a weapon system" [9]. India's reticence, born possibly out of a fear of the U.S., seems difficult to understand considering the Chinese record. China has the dubious distinction of being the first country to supply nuclear technolgoy to another state-Pakistan-with a design for a nuclear weapon. A secret 1983 U.S. State Department document, declassified in 1991, said that China had provided assistance to Pakistan `in the area of fissile material production and possibly also nuclear device design'. In the '90s the focus shifted to the means of delivering nuclear weapons. In June 1991, according to Air Commodore (retd) Jasjit Singh, Director of the Delhi-based Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, a Chinese official admitted at a Washington Press Club meeting that his country has supplied `short-range' missiles to Pakistan. In 1995, U.S. intelligence identified them as the DF-11 or M-11 missiles with a range of 300 km and detected signs of their deployment in ready-to-use canisters.
Last year, when India's Prithvi was sent to the Jalandhar depot for storage, Pakistan tested the Half-3, which most analysis said was nothing but the Chinese M-9, or the DF-15, a solid-propellant missle with a range of 600 km and capable of carrying a payload of one tonne. The test came around the time that a leading American weekly revealed the Chinese had also built an entire factory for the manufacture of missiles near Islamabad. All this was happening despite a 1994 Chinese committment to the U.S. that "China will not export ground-to-ground missiles... inherently capable of reaching a range of at least 300 km with a payload of at least 500 kg". China's solemn committment to the Nuclear NPT too did not stand in the way of aiding Pakistan's nuclear weapons' programme. In 1995, it sold some 70,000 ring magnets to keep Pakistan's Kahuta uranium enrichment facility going. The next year, special industrial furnaces and hi-tech diagonostic equipment used by nuclear weapons designers were supplied. All this has made the Indian armed forces wary of the Chinese moves towards India and far more realistic in the estimate of its intentions, especially after the 1962 debacle. According to Jasjit Singh, abundant caution calls for India to maintain adequate insurance for the eventuality of a shift in Chinese behaviour. `Look at the way in which the Hindi-Chini-bhai-bhai era of 1959 climaxed in a war just three years later', he says. He points to the Chinese references to reunification with Talwan as a `sacred mission', and speculates whether they could, in changed circumstances suddenly extend to Arunachal Pradesh as well. There are other regional developments that India needs to look out for. Beijing's influence in Myanmar has been steadily growing and it has a substantial military component. The most visible are a joint naval base at Hangyyi Island at the mouth of the Irrawady river and an electronic surveillance station at Coco Island, that tracks Indian missile tests on the Orissa coast. Despite all these not-so-benign signals, the ground reality is that India has to coexist with its instructable neighbour. It was probably with this in mind that last Thursday in Jaisalmer. Fernandes mellowed his stand, saying philosophically that India and China needed to live in peace with each other. Calling for an expanded diplomatic dialogue, he denied that the positions he had taken after the Ghauri launch were born of any obsession or personal prejudice. They were, he insisted, a result of "an objective analysis of national security"
With Fernandes striking, what many consider, the right chord on Sino-Indian ties, India may well sanp out of it self-imposed trance on matters relating to the Middle Kingdom. The new attitude will be tempered by the realistic assessment of the growth of Chinese military and economic power. But as Fernandes pointed out, many of these matters, especially those relating to the central issue of inducting nuclear weapons, must necessarily await the creation of a National Security Council which can conduct a Strategic Defence Review. "If at the end of the review, we believe we have to induce such weapons, then the decision will be taken", he said at Delhi's Press Club. Deliberation and caution may not be Fernandes' true style but in the present context, it is a sign of responsibility and maturity needed to convince our northern neighbour that enhancing India's vulnerabilities may not be such a good idea since they could well end up adding to Beijing's own insecurities. For a country of India's size and capability, China ought to be seen not as a threat but as a challenge. The proper Course of action will be to sign the CTBT now and ratify it after making sure that all the 44 Countries named in the treaty have either ratified it or are going to do so. What is most important for India's is ratifications by China and Pakistan. However, the Chinese ratification may be influenced by what the U.S., is ultimately going to do. Thus, India may have wait until the U.S., decides to ratify.
REFERENCES:
Manoj Joshi, "Beware the Dragon", India Today (27 April, 1998, Chennai)
The Times of India, 3rd December, 1996.
Werner Levi, Free India In Asia, Minneapolis, 1952, p.85.
[1]V.P.Dutt, India's Foreign policy, Vikas, New Delhi, p.277.
V.P. Dutt, India's Foreign Policy, Vikas, New Delhi, p.279.
The Times of India, 29th November, 1997.
Received on 3.11.2013 Modified on 20.01.2014
Accepted on 14.02.2014 © A&V Publication all right reserved
Int. J. Rev. & Res. Social Sci. 2(1): Jan. – Mar. 2014; Page 15-21